Twenty-third Report on the Activities of the Monetary Committee. 15 May 1982 by unknown
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
MONETARY COMMITTEE
TWENTY -THIRD REPORT
ON THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE MONETARY COMMITTEE
Brussels, 15 May 1982
Blank pages not reproduced: 2 , 12, 20, 24This publication is also available in the following languages:
ISBN 92-825-3113-
ISBN 92-825-3115-
Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1982
ISBN 92-825-3114-
Catalogue number: CB-35-82-522-EN-
~) ECSC-EEC-EAEC, Brussels 48 Luxenibourg, 1982
Printed in BelgiumSummary
Foreword............................................................................................................"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""......
Introduction..................
,........................,........,.......,.................................,.......................,....................................
II. Community action and the activities of the Committee ............................................................
III. Working parties of the Monetary  Committee............
,...................................................................
List of members and alternates of the Monetary Committee............................................................
Annex I : Opinion to the Council and the Commission on indexation mechanisms
(16 November 1981).......................................................................
...............................................
Annex II : Opinion on dollar interest rate and exchange rate developments
(25 June 1981) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
""""""""
Annex III : Opinion on the financial aspects of North-South relations
(15 June1981) """""""""""'
..""""""""""""""""" """""""""""."'.""............................... .........,..
Annex IV : Report by the Working Party on Harmonization of Monetary Policy
Instruments on 'The technical problems stemming from the co-existence
of monetary and exchange rate objectives within the EMS'
(22 October 1981) """""".........................................".........................................""""""""
""""" FOREWORD
In  1981 the Committee held nine sessions; the Committee s working parties and the
Alternates met on several occasions. The list of members in office during  1981  is annexed.
I.  INTRODUCTION
1. World economic trends in 1981 were subject to a number of unfavourable influences:
the aftermath of the second oil shock of 1980; the worsening of domestically generated
imbalances (in particular budgetary imbalances); wide and sometimes erratic swings in
interest rates and exchange rate relationships with the United States dollar. The effects of
these factors on the economies of the major country groupings varied, but on balance
activity may have picked up slightly in the course of 1981. The volume of world trade
remained at the same level as in 1980, since the volume of imports by members of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries continued to offset to some extent the low
level of other countries' imports , which was accounted for by a marked slowdown in
consumption and importation of oil. The imports of the non-oil developing countries
which have large external deficits to finance, increased at a slower rate in 1981. The oil-
producing countries' surpluses on current account decreased in 1981, after almost doubling
from 1979 to 1980. The industrialized countries recorded an aggregate deficit, although the
overall picture masks sharp individual differences.
2. In the Community, the recession that began in 1980 continued into 1981. The rate of
inflation remained generally high, and unemployment continued to rise. On the other hand,
the slowdown in imports combined with an improved export performance led to a reduction
in the current deficit in spite of a deterioration in the terms of trade over much of
1981. These aggregates, of course, mask differences between the countries, particularly
between inflation rates.
The European Monetary System (EMS) continued to function satisfactorily, despite
conditions that were generally unfavourable to the convergence of economies, and in the
face of the destabilizing effects of wide variations in the exchange rates and interest rates of
third currencies. Fluctuations in exchange rates between participant currencies were much
smaller than during the 10 years prior to the inception of the system. There were however
two EMS parity adjustments in 1981: the first, on 22 March, involved only one currency; the
second, on 4 October, was the first general realignment since that of 23 September
1979. These two adjustments, though different in character, confirmed that the EMS can
cope in an orderly fashion with realignments based on fundamental economic criteria.II. COMMUNITY ACTION AND THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE
3. Against this general economic and monetary background, marked by strong pressures
and turbulence, the Committee felt it was more than ever necessary to strive for cohesion
and monetary stability in the Community: it concentrated on the operation of the European
Monetary System and its possible development, on improving convergence of the economies
of the participating countries, and on international monetary relations.
4. The Committee kept .a close watch on economic and monetary trends and on the
resulting policies, both at Community level and' in the individual Member States. 
several occasions, in the course of 1981, it examined in detail particular aspects of the
Community s economic situation. An in-depth discussion on balance of payments and
exchange rates in the European Monetary System allowed, for example, an examination of
the fundamental trends affecting the exchange rates of participant currencies. Further-
more, at its October meeting, the Committee studied the stance of monetary policy in
Member States in connection with the setting of monetary objectives for 1982, about to be
decided by the monetary authorities of most Member States.
5. At a time of persistent disequilibria, aggravated by unstable exchange rate relations
with non-member countries and volatile interest rates outside the Community, it was
increasingly necessary to ensure the smooth functioning of the EMS, and to monitor its
evolution. Both the realignment decisions taken in 1981  and in particular the general
realignment of 4 October - were preceded by discussions in the Committee; the decisions
taken by the Ministers were based on the Committee s conclusions. Furthermore
important work was carried out by the Alternates on the technical aspects of the system
future development: This work culminated in a comrehensive inventory of the problems
raised by the system s development and in proposals for adequate solutions. The findings
were examined and discussed by the Committee, which identified a number of possible
developments. The European Council meeting in London on 26 and 27 November 1981
asked that this preparatory work lead to concrete proposals for reinforcing the system.
6. The Committee, aware that the reinforcement of the European Monetary System
depends on considerably greater convergence of the economies of the participant countries
stepped up its work in this field.
First, it examined the effects of certain rigid systems of indexation on economic trends in the
Member States, and studied the possible monetary consequences, taking into account the
proposals put forward by the Commission in its communication to the Council of 23 July
1981. In particular, the Committee felt that indexation presented serious drawbacks in the
face of present adjustment requirements. No indexation system should be operated in
such a way that it offsets for certain categories of income the consequences of economic
policy changes or of variations in the terms of trade. The Committee s position on this
question is stated in the Opinion of 16 November 1981 to the Council and the Commission
(see Annex I).
Secondly, the Committee made thorough studies of the economic and monetary situation in
two countries with special difficulties, Italy and Belgium. It examined the conditions
which had led the Italian authorities to take emergency measures on foreign currency
purchases, and put forward proposals for their gradual abolition. The Committeeemphasized that the policy to be pursued must attack the fundamental problems of the
Italian economy; its position and recommendations were the subject of two oral statements
by the Chairman to the Council. As regards Belgium, the Committee noted the
Commission s recommendation to the Government under Article 11 of the 1974 Decision on
convergence. It fully approved the Commission s initiative, in particular as the smooth
functioning of the European Monetary System requires stronger Community discipline; it
discussed the economic and monetary situation in Belgium on several occasions, together
with the corrective measures envisaged, and repeatedly confirmed its intention of closely
monitoring the implementation of principles expressed in the Commission s recommenda-
tion.
Thirdly, the Committee continued its regular examinations of the economies of the Member
States, independently from its discussions on exceptional situations or significant changes in
economic policy.
7. The trends of dollar interest rates and exchange rates had a decisive impact throughout
the world, including the Community. The Committee analysed the consequences of these
trends on several occasions, in the light both of the objectives of the US authorities and of
the possibilities open to the European authorities to guard against the effects of US
policy. In an opinion to the Council and the Commission (see Annex II), the Committee
while firmly supporting the general anti-inflationary thrust of US policy, expressed
reservations on the effects. of high and volatile US interest rates, provoking strong
fluctuations in the dollar exchange rate. In particular, the Committee stressed the
overriding importance, in an increasingly interdependent world, of close international
coordination and cooperation: no country should frame its domestic policies without due
regard to their international consequences, and large economies and leading reserve
currency centres have a special responsibility in this respect.
8. The Committee continued its work pursuant to the Council Decision of 8 May 1964
which provides that consultations shall take place within the- Monetary Committee in
respect of any important decision in the field of international monetary relations. The
Committee discussed the main points on the agenda of the Bretton Woods institutions; as it
does every year, it prepared the statement of the Council Presidency on behalf of the
Community to the IMF Interim Committee and the Annual Meeting of the IMF and the
World Bank.
With a view to the deliberations concerning North-South relations, the Committee
considered the monetary and financial aspects of the Commission s communication to the
Council of 7 May 1981 on Community policy for the North-South dialogue and, reaffirming
the approach laid out in its 1980 opinions and reports on recycling and on global
negotiations, stated its position on the various aspects of international financial cooperation
and the responsibility ofthe Bretton Woods institutions (see Annex III). The Committee
believes that international financial cooperation should be developed with a view, in
particular, to associating the oil-exporting countries and industrialized countries in the
financing and exploitation of the energy resources of the non-oil developing countries. 
furthermore considers that the World Bank's activities in the energy field should be
extended.III. WORKING PARTIES OF THE MONETARY COMMITTEE
9. The Working Party on the H;armonization of Monetary Policy Instruments, a joint
group of the Monetary Committee and the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks
submitted in October its report on the technical problems stemming from the coexistence of
monetary and exchange rate objectives within the EMS. This report compares potential
conflicts and empirical evidence of conflicts between the two, given the requirement for
convergence towards stability, and analyses the techniques used to mitigate temporary
conflicts. According to the report, it is unlikely that the potential for conflict will
disappear; only active coordination between monetary authorities in the EMS countries can
prevent the actual emergence of conflict situations.
10. The Working Party on Capital Markets completed its work on the development of
savings in equities in the Community countries, and continued to monitor trends in the
capital markets of the Member States and in the international capital market
, .
and reviewed
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OPINION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION
ON INDEXATION MECHANISMS
(16 November 1981)
At its meeting in Maastricht on 23 and 24 March 1981 the European Council took the view
that 'high .and divergent inflation rates are a threat both to the prospects of growth and to
the economic and monetary cohesion of the Community. In this context the European
Council also discussed the effects caused by rigid systems of indexation of incomes and
expressed the opinion that an adjustment of such mechanisms should be considered'. On
23 July 1981, the Commission issued a Communication to the Council on the principles of
indexation in the Community (COM (81) 457 final). Lastly, on 17 September, the Council
called upon the Coordinating Group and the Monetary Committee to examine this
Communication and to report on it at a future meeting.
In response to these initiatives, and with a view to contributing to greater convergence of
economic trends within the EMS, the Monetary Committee has looked at this question; it
stresses however that since the implications of indexation are not solely monetary, the
Committee s Opinion does not claim to cover all aspects of the problem, regarding which
other Community bodies might feel concerned. Furthermore, it notes that the question of
indexation, especially as regards its effects on competitiveness, cannot be examined in
isolation from the other elements affecting labour costs and other production costs. Struc-
tural adaptation and the re-establishment of European competitiveness require a global
approach affecting the totality of production costs.
I. General observations
1. Indexation is predominantly used as a means of offsetting the social consequences of
economic disequilibria. Yet indexation is by no means the only method to shield certain
sectors or groups in the economy from the detrimental effects of these disequilibria and
from inflation in particular. When such protection is effective, the result is clearly that the
economic agents enjoying it  and only they  become to some extent insensitive to
inflation. The return to a more balanced economic situation, in which the purchasing
power of money is stabilized, requires a conscientious effort of rigour and determination
difficult to realise in a rigidly indexed environment.
2. In conformity with the Council's request, the Committee has examined the Commis-
sion Communication on the principles of indexation in the Community. It observes greatconvergence between the content of this document and most of the views expressed within
the Committee. In particular it notes dose similarity in the analysis of the effects of
indexation, which leads the Commission, as the Committee, to consider that an essential
objective should be to adjust existing mechanisms so as to remedy their main disadvantages.
The Committee considers that the adjustment of indexation systems according to the
principles outlined below would constitute an important step towards achieving greater
convergence of economic performancewithiiJ. the Community and the maintenance of stable
exchange rate relationships within the EMS.
ll. Indexation of incomes
3. The indexation systems applied in the Member States vary widely. Three Member
States (Germany, the United Kingdom and Greece) have no system for indexing incomes
wages and salaries in particular. The situation in the others is very varied, ranging from
indexation solely of the minimum wage (France) or the occasional introduction, in wage
agreements, of cost-of-living adjustments (Ireland), to general indexation (Italy, the
Benelux countries and Denmark).
The indexation of retirement pensions and transfer incomes is fairly general. Lastly, the
adjustment of income tax allowances and thresholds, to prevent inflation from distorting the
progressive nature of taxation, must also be considered a form of indexation affecting the
formation of incomes.
4. The Committee recognises that, during certain periods of relative price stability and
moderate adjustments of nominal incomes, indexation mechanisms may have settled pay
issues in a helpful way and encouraged the conclusion of agreements lasting more than one
year, avoiding overtrequent wage negotiations and thus lessening social conflict. Further
wage determination is a complex process, in which indexation is only one of many
. elements. The Committee stresses, however, that in a period with large changes in relative
prices and the ensuing problems of structural adaptation of output and demand, the rigidity
in economic adjustments introduced by automatic or semi-automatic compensation for price
increases may constitute a considerable drawback. In practice indexation is often based on
a concept of maintenance not only of purchasing power but also on a specific basket of
expenditure which is irreconcilable with the need for income adaptation, substitution and
structural change.
5. In particular, the Committee emphasizes that if external economic relationships are
suddenly altered (deterioration in the terms of trade due to an inflationary shock or to a
change in exchange rate relationships), indexation impedes the necessary adjustments and
therefore tends to perpetuate the external disequilibrium. The same is true of price
increases due to internal forces  either demand or cost induced  which will tend to be
perpetuated. Then again, if indirect taxation is increased in order to obtain certain
adjustment effects (e.g. on the structure of consumption), the effects may be neutralized by
the action of indexation; furthermore, higher taxation will, through indexation, push up
wage costs and help to damage competitiveness. The room for manreuvre of the
authorities, in terms of monetary and taxation policy, is constrained by the existence of such
mechanisms.
6. It is true that the rigidities and distortions caused by  de jure  or  de facto 
indexation arrangements do not necessarily take the form of more rapid inflation. Through
a non-accommodating monetary policy, the authorities may, in certain countries, indeedsucceed in moderating the wage-price spiral and inflationary expectations. However, the
costs of taking monetary measures strong enough to offset the inflationary pressures of
indexation will emerge elsewhere, e.g. in terms of growth and employment, and such costs
are likely to be higher than would be the case under a smooth income adjustment to changes
in external conditions or to fiscal policy measures.
7. In view of these considerations, the Committee feels that the recourse to indexation
presents drawbacks for the conduct of economic policy faced with the need for adjustment
and makes it more difficult to defend the value of money. It is therefore of the opinion
that no additional indexation procedures should be introduced and that the scope of the
present systems should not be extended. Where such systems exist, it would be desirable
that, by a combined action of the public authorities and the two sides of industry, their
scope be reduced so that they no longer undermine the effectiveness of certain economic
policy instruments.
To this end, no indexation system should be operated in such a way that it passes on from
prices into incomes the consequences of factors that are exogenous to the labour-business
relationship, such as economic policy changes or variations in the terms of trade. This
could be allowed for in the definition of the index, or in the degree and frequency of
compensation , including, possibly,  ad hoc  agreements to forego indexation portions in
circumstances clearly characterized by imperative needs for economic adjustment.
The effort to reduce the scope of indexation should extend to all its forms, including
property income and professional fees.
ID. Financial indexation
8. The Commission Communication to the Council does not deal explicitly with financial
indexation. However, the Commission has already had occasion to express its position on
the question of the protection of savings in times of inflation, 1 and the Committet"- itself has
several times examined this specific question. Such examination highlighted in particular
the two major problems confronting an economy using indexation of financial assets: first
the risk of an extension in the application of indexation measures and of an accentuated
distortion in monetary functions, and second, the risk of disrupting financial circuits
entailed in the introduction of measures discriminating in favour of certain transactions.
9. For these reasons amongst others, the Committee requested that the inclusion 
indexation clauses in a foreign loan by a Member State be subject to prior consultation
within the Committee and that, as far as possible, there should be a similar consultation on
internal loans. The Committee has furthermore on several occasions 2 warned against the
opening of discussions on techniques which would endeavour to safeguard automatically the
real value of monetary or financial assets, whether they are held by developing or by other
countries. In the context of the adjustment of the Community loan mechanism, it also
indicated that for borrowings under this heading variable rate loans should not be given
preference over fixed rate borrowing and should in particular be avoided when borrowing
directly from surplus countries. 
1 Commission Communication to the European Parliament 
- '
The protection of savings in times of inflation and the question of
indexation' (COM (77) 549 final - November 1977), 2 See in particular the Opinion on the financial aspec~ of NOrth-
&JiJth relations (Annex III).
3 Report to the Council and the Commission on recycling (See Annex II of the 22nd Report on the activities of the Monetary
Committee).10. The Committee has not this time reconsidered the question of the indexation of
financial assets in detail. It is however of the opinion that generalizd financial indexation
should be opposed as it would be regarded as a capitulation to inflation and a demonstration
of the inability to eliminate the mechanisms that perpetuate inflationary pressures in our
economies, thus entrenching inflationary expectations. Financial assets and the returns
they provide mustbe encouraged to adapt to overall economic conditions (not only to rates
of inflation). This presupposes increased competition between financial intermediaries
less segregation of financial channels and greater contractual freedom between debtors and
creditors.
The Committee acknowledges that a high rate of inflation is likely to have undesirable
effects on the distribution of income and wealth between debtors and creditors. In such a
situation, marked by great uncertainties about future interest rates and about the time-scale
for the easing of inflation, certain limited forms of inflation-proofing may temporarily help
to meet the needs of lenders and borrowers alike, bringing them together on terms which
both fird acceptable; such forms give financial markets the necessary flexibility to adapt to
rapidly changing circumstances and thus protect the existence of a long~term mar-
ket. However also cetain other techniques for long term lending (such as variable rates)
may in some cases reduce the effectiveness of interest rate management for monetary
authorities, aligning financial market conditions automatically on those of the money
markets, which are influenced by a different order of considerations.ANNEX II
OPINION ON DOLLAR INTEREST RATE
AND EXCHANGE RATE DEVELOPMENTS
(25 June 1981)
1. As requested by the Council on 15 June 1981, in full awareness that the difficulties
experienced by Community countries are of both internal and external origin, the Monetary
Committee has examined the consequences of dollar interest rate and exchange rate
developments for the Community economy. The present Opinion, adopted at its session
of 25 June, sets out the main results of its discussion. 
2. In the 20 months since the change in techniques of monetary control announced by the
Federal Reserve Board on 6 October 1979, US interest rates throughout the maturity
spectrum have fluctuated over a very wide range, both in nominal and in real terms, thus
attracting unprecedented attention to their variations and their level. European interest
rates were broadly compelled to follow the upward movement of US rates, but did so on a
generally steadier course. Both short and long term nominal interest rates within the
Community are now either at or close to record levels, and in the lower inflation countries
real interest rates are also extremely high.
3. Many factors affect exchange rates but, among these, high and variable US interest
rates in 1980-81 have powerfully contributed to a marked fluctuation in the dollar exchange
rate around a strongly rising trend against EMS participating currencies, which have
however remained remarkably stable  vis-a-vis  each other. In the twelve months to mid-
June 1981, the dollar has appreciated by between 35% and 42% against EMS currencies.
4. It is in the interest of the world economy that US inflation should come down as
rapidly as possible: the Community should thus firmly support the general anti-inflationary
thrust of US policy. At the same time it is important that the United States take into
account the international consequences of the choices in the framing and executing of
monetary, budgetary and public debt management policies, all the more so at the present
time when the prospects for improved growth and employment are so tenuous.
5. The Committee considered the main problems raised by the above developments
taking in turn the variability of interest rates, the level of interest rates and exchange rate
developments. It draws attention on the following aspects of these three problems:(a) variability of interest rates
changes in interest rates affect relative costs, resource allocation and economic
behaviour;
large and erratic variations in interest rates, and particularly large switch-back
movements over a considerable period, entail  on the one hand ~ a climate of
uncertainty and wait and .see attitudes which upset investment decisions and - on the
other  destabilize markets, especially at the long end;
high interest rate volatility entails an increased recourse to variable rate financing and to
short-term market instruments to finance longer term investments: although firms and
banks can then benefit more rapidly from a fall in inflation, they become more
vulnerable to adverse financial developments;
techniques of monetary control play an especially important role in determining interest
rate volatility; in the Committee s view these techniques should pay attention to the
trend movement in the target aggregate rather than to short-term deviations;
consequently, measures such as a staggering and a 'de-dramatization' of the publication
of money supply figures, with an emphasis on the medium-term trend, have been
suggested as means to reducing interest rate volatility. The recourse to more
diversified instruments for controlling the growth of the monetary aggregates would go
in the same direction.
(b) level of interest rates
high interest rates are a consequence of high rates of inflation and, at the same time, an
essential part of a determined fight against inflation through a strict monetary policy;
. ~ 
in general the level of interest rates can be reduced, whilst not relaxing anti-inflationary
policy, by substantially reducing the government deficit. This is not only valid for the
US, taking into account the savings rate, but also for Community member countries
where the policy mix is far from adequate and where relatively restrictive monetary
policies exist alongside large and persistent public sector deficits;
as fiscal treatment of interest rate payments by households in the US allows relatively
considerable deductions, interest rates have to be really very high to have an .effect on
personal borrowers;
while in most Community countries there are domestically-generated reasons for
relatively high interest rates, peaks in US rates may have led, in a number of member
countries, to higher interest rates than generally warranted by purely domestic
considerations;
excessively high real interest rates, if long continued, penalize productive investment at a
time when structural adjustment requires, for both internal and external reasons, and in
particular to reabsorb unemployment, an increase in the share of investments in
aggregate demand;
high interest rates weigh heavily on the service of the public debt of many industrialized
countries;
high real interest rates add to the debt servicing burden of non-oil developing countries
which have had recourse to variable interest rate loans. This debt service is absorbing a
rising share of their export revenues, at a time when slow world growth restricts their
export markets.(c) exchange rates
the fluctuations of US short-term interest rates have been an important, although not
exclusive, cause of the marked variability of exchange rates and may have strengthened
overshooting
' ;
-a strong divergence of exchange rate trends from relative price and cost developments
could store up further currency unrest in the future, because inflation differentials might
eventually predominate among the factors, including the current account positions
which affect exchange rates;
because of the depreciation of its currencies, Europe is now experiencing a new, strong
wave of import price increases, analogous to that caused by an oil shock; .
developments since the transition to generalized floating in 1973 indicate that there is a
need for some degree of foreign. exchange intervention to deal with disorderly market
conditions and erratic movements, in line with IMF guidelines and articles. The US
policy on exchange rate intervention as recently outlined to Congress seems to go too far
in limiting its use in disorderly market conditions. In a world in which reserve holders
tend to currency diversification, it is, in particular, essential that the reactions of the
authorities of the various reserve centres be mutually consistent and complementary.
6. On this occasion, the Committee wishes to stress that, although high and volatile US
interest rates and strongly fluctuating exchange rates undoubtedly contribute to the
difficulties experienced by Community member countries, these difficulties are to a large
degree domestically-generated and that, as a general principle, responsibility for combating
inflation by all appropriate means begins at home.
In conclusion, the Committee stresses the over-riding importance, in an increasingly
interdependent world, . of close international coordination and cooperation: no country
should frame its domestic policies without due regard to their international consequences,
and large economies and leading reserve currency centres have a special reponsibility in this
respect.ANNEX III
OPINION ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS
(15 June 1981)
1. Having received the Commission communication to the Council on Community policy
for the North-South dialogue (COM (81) 68 of 7 May 1981), the Monetary Committee
discussed the financial aspects of this communication at its meeting on 10 June 1981. Since
these problems come within its sphere of responsibility, the Committee has taken the
initiative of drafting the present Opinion.
General principles
2. The Committee first of all notes a certain tendency to a dispersion of the discussions
and the definition of positions on the monetary and financial aspects of international
.relations; in this regard, the Committee considers it expedient to point out that:
(i) at Community level, the Council decision of 8 May 1964 states that the most
appropriate method of ensuring a close coordination of the policies of the Member
States in this field is for the necessary consultations to be held within the Monetary
Committee;
(ii) at world level, the Bretton Woods institutions are responsible for dealing with these
problems. They have access to the means of raising the necessary funds and the
procedures to encourage borrowers to adopt the appropriate adjustment policies.
Furthermore, the main parties involved are suitably represented in these institu-
tions. The Community countries have a duty and an interest, in view of their weight in
these institutions, to maintain their role, to reinforce their action and to encourage
coordination between them.
3. The Committee considers that the entirety and specificity of the responsibilities of the
Bretton Woods institutions .must be maintained, which does not exclude that the activities of
these institutions might be developed by the means which the Committee has already
indicated in earlier Opinions, and in accordance with the conclusions of the last meetings of
the IMF Interim Committee and the Development Committee. This general principle
must underlie the approach to international monetary problems and the search for
solutions: it is thus in the framework of the Bretton Woods institutions that the financial
aspects of North-South relations ought to be examined.Financial aspects of North-South relations
4. The Committee examined the 'financial aspects' section of the Commission communi-
cation, without however going into the details of the various proposals put forth therein
and intends returning to them as and when required.
5. Firstly, the Committee would re-affirm the view which it has already expressed in its
Opinions and Reports of 4 June, 10 October (on recycling) and 14 November 1980 (on
global negotiations). It is of the opinion that the bulk of the recycling activity will have to
continue to be carried out through the international financial markets and the commercial
banks; that this important role played by the international banking system will have to be
supplemented by an expanded activity of the international organizations, primarily the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the regional development banks; and
finally that the oil-exporting countries have a special responsibility in the financing of
international payments imbalances.
6. Given the important role played by the international banking system in recycling, firm
support must be given to efforts directed at safeguarding the soundness and stability of this
system. In addition to this support, the Committee feels that the most stable forms of
private resource transfers, particularly direct investments, ought to be encouraged and
developed.
7. The role played by the markets will however have to be supplemented and supported
by action 0.0 the part of the international institutions. As regards the development
institutions, they have a vital role to play, both as regards the transfer of resources and the
formulation of development principles. The Committee believes that these institutions are
capable of adapting to the requirements of a new situation, as they have proved in the past;
they should however be provided with the means to this end and the instruments at their
disposal should be used to the best effect. An improved cooperation and a close
coordination between the international financing institutions must be sought and organized,
and co-financing or consortium operations enouraged. The Committee considers that, in
the .search for financing formulae, account should be taken of the varied situations of the
developing countries, and feels that an increase in public development aid to the poorest
countries is necessary to help them overcome the serious difficulties they face. The
multilateral channels, which have so far shown their worth, must be given the financial
resources appropriate to their functions, along with a continuing flow of bilateral aid.
The Committee believes that international financial cooperation might be developed with a
view to, in particular, associating the oil-exporting countries and industrialized countries in
the financing and exploitation of the energy resources of the non-oil developing countries.
. The Committee considers that firm support should be give.o to the proposal for extending
the activities of the World Bank in the energy field and for studying appropriate measures to
this end, including the possible setting up of a specialized affiliate. More generally, the
Committee calls for the development and reinforcement of international financial coopera-
tion in order to improve the stability of the financial system, but reiterates its warnings
about proposals which would lead to the opening of discussions on ways of protecting the
real value of the oil surpluses.
8. With regard to the International Monetary Fund, it must be stressed that quotas must
remain its main .source of finance, while recognizing the need  in current circumstances 
for the Fund to borrow.The OPEC surplus countries should furthermore play their full part in financing inter-
national payments imbalances. Saudi Arabia has demonstrated its willingness to commit
itself in this direction, by concluding lending arrangements to the IMF. The Committee
notes that these loans have been made on the basis of market conditions and parallel 
loans made by various industrialized countries. It feels that other surplus countries should
also contribute to increasing the resources available to the IMF.
9. In conclusion, the Committee emphasizes that an atmosphere of permanent negotia-
tion over international monetary relations might well create uncertainty which would be
prejudicial to the stability of currencies and to the monetary system as a whole. The
Committee Will continue to examine the various aspects of international finance and will
state its views thereon as and when required.ANNEX IV
TECHNICAL PROBLEMS STEMMING FROM THE CO-EXISTENCE
OF MONETARY AND EXCHANGE RATE OBJECTIVES
WITHIN THE EMS
Report by the Working Party on the Harmonization
of monetary policy instruments
(22 October 1981)
Introduction
In February 1981 the Committee of EEC Central Bank Governors and the Monetary
Committee expressed the wish that the Working Party on harmonization of monetary policy
instruments should produce a report on the second of the three indents of a new mandate 
This report, under the title of 'Technical problems stemming from the co-existence of
. monetary and exchange rate objectives within the EMS' is divided into five chapters:
Monetary and exchange rate objectives in EEC countries;
Potential conflicts between monetary and exchange rate objectives due to EMS
membership;
Empirical evidence of conflicts between exchange rate and monetary objectives in the
EMS;
Mitigation of temporary conflicts between domestic monetary policy objectives and
EMS exchange rate commitments;
Conclusions.
I. Monetary and exchange rate objectives in EEC countries
A. Monetary objectives
In all EEC countries the principal objective of monetary policy is to set the appropriate
monetary framework for the attainment of final economic objectives. 2 To achieve these
ultimate aims, monetary policy is defined in terms of specific intermediate objectives for the
financial variables (money or credit aggregates, interest rates, etc.) which may be affected
I The full mandate is annexed to this report.
2 Final economic objectives in general concern inflation, growth, unemployment and the balance of payments (in particular the current
account).by the instruments available to the authorities. As shown below, there are, however
substantial differences between EEC countries with regard to the kind of intermediate
objectives chosen by the authorities and the degree of commitment to their achieve-
ment. These differences are due to a variety of reasons and reflect differences in the
instrumental role of monetary policy in achieving final economic objectives.
Three large EEC countries (Germany, France, United Kingdom) all gear their monetary
policies predominantly to domestic objectives and especially to controlling inflation through
publicly-announced money supply targets. The publication of targets is seen as a way of
providing the expectational framework for a reduction in inflation and influencing exchange
rate expectations. In addition, by representing a forward commitment ofthe authorities, it
constitutes an element of self-discipline in the conduct of policy, requiring the authorities to
take action to ensure the target is respected. The United Kingdom (where targets are
furthermore formulated in the framework of a medium-term approach for a gradual
deceleration in money supply growth) has published target ranges for money supply growth
over a number of years in the belief that clearly stated medium-term objectives will create a
more favourable expectational framework. In France and Germany the authorities
consider committing themselves in advance to a fixed path over several years as unrealistic
in view of the uncertainties with regard to the emergence of exogenous disturbances and
possible. changes in behaviour in the real and monetary sectors.
External considerations are particularly valid for smaller EEC countries with open
economies, as, for example, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands. In these
countries publicly announced exchange rate commitments within the EMS largely play the
role of published monetary targets. In some of them the exchange rate commitment is
supported by the setting of an internal monetary objective. However, given the impor-
tance of the exchange rate for final economic objectives, especially price stability,
intermediate monetary objectives may be less binding or even only an indicator for the
authorities, and the setting of a medium-term objective is generally ruled out by the
emphasis of monetary policy on external considerations. Furthermore, in certain cases the
choice between an overall money supply approach and one based on monetary creation
from domestic sources is dictated by the particular external position of the non-monetary
sector (overall deficit or surplus).
In Italy almost continuous concern with an external deficit has favoured the choice of total
domestic credit as the most appropriate target variable. However, when the external
account is in surplus, the authorities place greater emphasis on the behaviour of monetary
aggregates to keep monetary conditions in line with the aim of a progressive reduction of
inflation. The high degree of substitutability between money and other financial assets has
favoured the choice of broader aggregates such as M3 or total financial assets.
In all countries, whether they operate on a money supply or credit objective, a certain
degree of operational flexibility is generally maintained; the authorities accept departures
from the target path to take account of short-run fluctuations in money demand and/or to
counter exchange rate developments which are seen to jeopardize domestic final objectives.
In cases of institutional or other permanent changes in demand for money, even the targets
may be adjusted.
B. Exchange rate objectives
The explicit exchange rate objective of all countries participating in the EMS exchange rate
mechanism is to maintain their currencies in the EMS. At least in the short run this implies
adherence to a fixed exchange rate system with limited margins of fluctuation. In thelonger run it is accepted that as the need arises  and in particular as indicated by the
relative development of economic fundamentals in participating countries  realignments
will take place.
The' economic motives of adherence to the EMS vary from country to country but all
countries recognize the value of a stable exchange rate system, with clearly defined bilateral
exchange rates, backed up with substantial credit facilities. In several countries EMS
participation means achieving short":run stabilization of their currencies against most of their
principal trading partners, allowing them to trade in a stable exchange rate area. In a
number of countries adherence to the system is seen as facilitating the control of inflation by
placing constraints on domestic sources of inflation and in some countries as choosing a
strong currency option
' . 
An additional.economic advantage, relevant in particular for the
larger member countries, is that, providing that there is convergence of economic policies
and final economic results, the EMS exchange rate mechanism allows the 'communitariza-
tion' of external shocks by moderating what might have been extreme fluctuations in their
bilateral exchange rates  vis-a-vis  the US dollar whenever there are major movements
between reserve currencies.
Greece and the United Kingdom have so far chosen not to participate in the exchange rate
mechanism, though not for the same reasons. For Greece, this has been due to the
particularly high level of inflation when compared with that in other EMS countries, which
would have made participation extremely difficult. The United Kingdom authorities have
argued that it has been differently placed from most other member countries in two
important respects: first, sterling has been affected by the United Kingdom s new status asa
major oil producer; secondly, the UK economy is undergoing a period of adjustment, with
fundamental changes in economic policy aimed at substantially reducing the rate of inflation
by controlling the rate of monetary growth. Both of these developments are likely to have
substantial temporary and permanent effects on the exchange rate., which are, however
difficult to quantify.
Most member countries' primary and explicit exchange rate aim is thus the observance of
EMS margins. In addition to this general commitment, however, several countries note
the particular operational benefits of a more clearly defined position in the EMS
band. Most countries are of the opinion that it is preferable or easier to maintain a more
precise position in the EMS band than accept the full margin of fluctuation. In Denmark
and Italy experience indicates that the amounts of intervention needed to stabilize their
currencies in the EMS are normally lower when these currencies are in the upper part 
around the middle of the band, whereas pressure tends to become self-reinforcing if the
lower limit is approached. Thus a short-term policy of maintaining their currencies in
defensible' positions within the EMS is followed. In the Netherlands the prime benefit of
participation in the EMS exchange rate mechanism has been to maintain a stable DM-
guilder exchange rate whenever the Deutsche Mark is strong in the EMS band, accepting
the consequent disciplining effects and making it easier to avoid changing the DM-guilder
central rate in the event of an EMS realignment. In contrast, the German opinion is that it
would be neither practical nor meaningful for Germany to .aim to maintain the Deutsche
Mark in a given area of the EMS band.
Finally, no participating country is indifferent to movements of third currencies, in
particular of the US dollar, as these movements affect their effective exchange rates, albeit
unevenly, and thus may hav~ an unfavourable effect on domestic inflation and the balance
of payments. It should be noted, however, that while smaller countries can hardly affect
their dollar rates given bilateral EMS margins, policy decisions in the monetary field inlarger countries (especially Germany, given the DM's role as an alternative reserve
currency) carry more weight in influencing their dollar exchange rate or the position of the
EMS band as a whole against third currencies.
ll. Potential conflicts between monetary and exchange rate objectives due to EMS
membership
A. Definition of conflict within the EMS exchange rate mechanism
Within the EMS, conflict between the exchange rate and monetary policy objectives of a
single country will arise when exchange rate commitments dictate a shift in policy 1 which, if
maintained, will undermine the chances of achieving the nation s intermediate monetary
objectives and the final economic objectives. Furthermore, insofar as participation in the
EMS exchange rate system results in an undesired movement against third currencies, the
resultant effective exchange rate movement may lead to deviations from the final economic
objectives, indirectly reflecting conflict between EMS membership and monetary policy
objectives.
B. Examples of potential conflict
A number of instances of potential conflict between EMS countries' exchange rate and
monetary policy objectives  could arise. In some cases such conflicts can be assumed to be
of a temporary nature such as for instance when one country finds its cyclical position
temporarily out of phase with that of its EMS partners; when market exchange rate
expectations move excessively in favour of or against a currency; or during the gestation
period of a domestic stabilization programme, when the benefits have still to be seen and
performance of key economic variables remains disappointing. In all these cases where the
conflicts are not related to differences in fundamental economic performance, a solution
through realignment is clearly unwarranted and the burden of countering tensions in the
EMS will fall primarily on monetary policy, although this may imply that certain domestic
objectives of monetary policy will have to be temporarily sacrificed.
In other cases where the conflict is of a  more durable nature  because of fundamental
differences in economic performance, two scenarios can be envisaged. First, a country
with a consistently better record on fundamentals than its partners may well find itself at the
top of a fully stretched EMS band. Intervention in the foreign exchange markets and a
resulting easing of monetary conditions, whilst called for in order to comply with EMS
commitments, may endanger not only the intermediate monetary objective but also the final
economic objectives. If the authorities choose instead to fend off inflows by easing
monetary policy, this might also conflict with domestic objectives. This scenario has most
frequently been illustrated by Germany.
The second scenario applies to a country with weak economic growth and high unemploy-
ment whose currency is at the bottom of the EMS band. The appropriate monetary
measures or foreign exchange market intervention would depress economic activity further
1 Such a policy shift may occur either when the effective stance of monetary policy has to be altered in order to maintain the currency
within the given EMS margins, or in response to the presumption to act when the divergence threshold has been crossed, or to hold the
currency at a preferred position in the EMS band. The shift in effective stance can result from:
intervention in the foreign exchange markets, with expansionary or contractionary effects on domestic monetay conditions;
and/or the implementation of appropriate monetary measures to eliminate the need for inteventions or at least contain their size,reducing the prospect of achieving the final economic objectives, although any risk of
overshooting the intermediate monetary objective would be reduced. Since the EMS was
established this type of conflict has been characterized at certain times by Belgium.
In these scenarios where the conflict is of a more fundamental nature and the symptoms
those respectively of an undervalued or an overvalued currency the appropriate solution
should in principle include a realignment of central rates. In general this has been
accepted, as illustrated by the history of both the snake arrangement and the EMS.
In many cases however, the situation may well be less clear-cut. For instance a revaluation
may not be appropriate if the authorities are in doubt about the durability of external
demand. Similarly a devaluation may be inappropriate if a nominal devaluation cannot be
made effective, for instance because of widespread wage indexation. There may also be
other reasons (either political or associated with developments in third currencies) why a
realignment is delayed although justified on strictly economic grounds; and last, but not
least, a realignment of course means that a difference in economic performance becomes
embodied in the exchange rate structure and that the hope of 'rolling back' the discrepancy
through the disciplinary effect of a fixed exchange rate system is given up.
For all these reasons the burden of countering tensions in the EMS may fall on monetary
policy for shorter or longer periods also in those cases where the conflict has the symptoms
of being of a more durable nature. Given that a more balanced policy response would be
desirable in such circumstances, this would have to include economic and fiscal measures in
addition to monetary policy action in cases of conflict arising from fundamental incompati-
bilities in the economy.
The movement of the EMS band against third currencies  may in sOme cases offset and in
others reinforce conflict. For example, if a fully-stretched EMS band were appreciating
against third currencies as conflict emerged under the first scenario, then in the short run an
. increase in the effective exchange rate which could not be achieved through realignment
might be brought about by an appreciation against third currencies, reducing the risk of 
higher inflation resulting fom the monetary action necessary to respect the EMS limits. 
the other hand, under the second scenario, where weak domestic economic activity was the
main preoccupation and not inflation control as in most other EMS countries, the situation
would not be helped by the appreciation of the band against third currencies and might even
be made worse, at least in the short run. Not only will the currency s appreciation against
third currencies tend to depress export demand and strengthen import penetration, further
weakening economic activity, but its effective exchange rate will become increasingly
unrealistic, requiring a further tightening of monetary policy to check further exchange rate
weakness in the EMS bnd. An additional consideration, disregarded in this analysis but
important to note, is that EMS currencies -are normally affected to a different extent by
movements in third currencies. If third currencies weaken against the EMS band and the
currency alr~ady at the top, being a 'substitute reserve currency' tends to come under
stronger upward pressure than its EMS partners, tension in the EMS will be intensified.
In contrast, the effect of a downward movement of the EMS band against third currencies
would be the opposite, intensifying the inflationary risk for the currency at the top of the
EMS and easing the effect on economic activity of the weakest EMS currency, although in
this case imported inflation would be greater.
For a number of general reasons  potential conflicts may not be felt or observed.  One main
reason is that a response lag exists between monetary policy actions and final economic
variables, while an immediate effect can often be seen in the nominal exchange ratefollowing monetary policy action. This lack of coincidence implies that exchange rate
considerations may be given priority for some time without impinging materially on the
attainment of final economic objectives provided the breathing-space offered by the
response lag allows the monetary authorities to return to their earlier stance without
renewed exchange rate pressures.
Another reason why anticipated conflict may not be felt in practice is that authorities may,
pragmatically, be prepared to accept a .certain amount of slippage from some or all of their
initial intermediate monetary and/or final economic objectives as they see that the
assumptions and expectations on which they were based are no longer valid or that changing
economic conditions require a different policy mix.
ill. Empirical evidence of conflict between exchange rate and monetary objectives in the
EMS
A. Summary of events within the EMS
Although the EMS exchange rate mechanism has occasionally experienced some tensions
since its start in March 1979 (see the attached chart No 2) and interventions have been
sizable, 1 there have been very few major conflicts between monetary policy objectives and
EMS exchange rate commitments. Monetary targets were met with relative accuracy in
the past two years (see the attached Table II), and the EMS exchange rate mechanism has
been maintained with stabilization of exchange rates. Although this required four
realignments, only two were general. Those monetary policy measures that were neces-
sary could be reversed after a while or proved to be necessary also for domestic
reasons. In the EMS, which covers a more varied group of countries than in the 'snake
economic performance was however more divergent.
Speculative capital movements based on expectations of a realignment of EMS central rates
occurred only during limited periods.  In the summer of  1979  the Deutsche Mark  came
under upward pressure as a result of the continuing uncertainty surrounding the exchange
rate of the US dollar and rumours of a parity realignment in connection with the review of
some provisions of the EMS six months after its start. These flows may have been
accentuated by interest rate rises in Germany intended to avoid any excessive expansion of
monetary aggregates which would have accommodated the inflationary impact of the energy
price increase. Whereas Germany succeeded in reducing the monetary impact of these
flows through sterilization measures, other countries, especially Belgium and Denmark, had
to tighten their monetary policies in order to defend their currencies. After the
realignment in September 1979 the tensions eased and the higher level of interest rates in
Germany s partner countries was considered necessary also for domestic reasons or was
considered unavoidable in view of the rise in US interest rates.
The weakness of the DM  within the EMS exchange rate mechanism during  the autumn of
1980 and the beginning of  1981 reflected several domestic and external developments.
Domestically, the Bundesbank did not allow monetary conditions to tighten in response to
interventions on foreign exchange markets since it regarded the interest-rate related
1 Interventions in EEC currencies from the beginning of the EMS until August 1981 amounted to the equivalent of more than USD 30
thousand million whereas interventions in USD (which also in part assist cohesion of EMS currencies) totaUd over USD 20 thousand
million (purchases) and almost USD 60 thousand million (sales).strengthening of the US dollar as a temporary phenomenon. Moreover, by early autumn
the domestic inflation rate had been brought down to a more acceptable level while the real
economy was somewhat weaker than expected.
The Bundesbank only changed its policy of offsetting all outflows of funds at unchanged
interest rates when, in February, the Deutsche Mark suffered a new bout of weakness and it
became clear that a number of factors, including the persistant weakness of the German
current account  also reflecting a loss of international market share and increasing import
penetration of the domestic market  the lack of progress in energy policy and the Federal
Republic s exposed political situation, had led to changes in market assessment of the
DMIUS dollar exchange rate. In addition, the rise in import prices since mid-1980 had
begun to raise inflationary expectations at home, while recognition of re-accelerating
German inflation as well as the deterioration in the current account due to J-curve effects
contributed to the unfavourable shift in exchange market expectations against the Deutsche
Mark. The particular weakness of the Deutsche Mark, not only against the US dollar but
also against most other EMS currencies, meant that the period was marked by a fully
stretched EMS band, with the French franc generally at the top and by periodic intervention.
Speculative downward pressures on the French franc in May  1981 caused some conflicts not
only in France, which had to take drastic measures to stop speculation, but also in some
other EMS countries. The sale of Deutsche M~rk in support of the French franc did not
directly threaten the stance of German monetary policy. Nevertheless, at a time of
particularly high and rising US interest rates, it contributed to a further weakening of the
DM/US dollar exchange rate and the EMS band underwent a further depreciation  vis-a-vis
the US dollar, which was already .at a higher level than thought desirable by some EMS
countries. The conflict was, however, only temporary because the French policy measures
had a rapid effect on the exchange markets.
Tension because of pronounced expectations of EMS central rate realignments was thus
confined to fairly limited periods although divergence in economic performance persis-
ted. In other periods, however, it could be held that the very stability of exchange rate
expectations led to undesirable capital movements, necessitating exchange market interven-
tion, the reason being that nominal interest rate differentials were not offset by expectations
of central rate realignments. In other words market participants thought they could take
advantage of prevailing high interest rates in high inflation countries without  at least in
the short run  running a risk of losing on the exchange rate.
In the event there were only a few occasions  affecting Denmark and Italy in  1979  and
France and Ireland in 1980-  when domestically determined interest rate levels caused
disturbing capital inflows, and then solutions were generally rapidly found. In Denmark a
temporary ban on the sale of government bonds to non-residents was introduced and after a
while foreign demand for mortgage bonds also dwindled. France and Ireland had recourse
to measures sterilizing the expansionary effect on money market conditions of foreign
exchange inflows and discouraging further capital imports. In Italy, on the other hand, the
authorities accepted the easing of domestic monetary conditions in order not to strengthen
the upward pressure on the lira, but the main motivation may have been the desire to favour
the pick up of economic activity after a protracted period of low output and high
unemployment.
Similarly, the fact that intra-EMS capital flows have in some periods been guided mainly by
nominal interest rate differentials has only rarely caused conflicts in those countries where
low inflation rates might be expected to warrant relatively low interest rates. Throqghout
the life of the EMS, Belgium has had to maintain interest rates at high levels relative toother EEC countries after allowance for inflation differentials, but most of this dilemma
could be attributed to more fundamental problems of the Belgian economy.
B. Analysis of factors causing, limiting or preventing conflicts
As described above, there was only limited conflict between adherence to the EMS and
monetary policy aims from March 1979 onwards. The principal unsettling influence has
come from developments outside the EMS.  Several factors however combined to minimize
the effect of this unsettling influence. First, a favourable position at the start of the EMS
(newcomers with above average inflation rates entering the EMS with competitive exchange
rates  see Table III) provided a margin of tolerance and saved the EMS from immediate
exchange rate difficulties. Secondly, traditionally strong currencies, including the Deut-
sche Mark, were hit by a weakening of their current account, partly because of the oil price
increase, thereby reducing expectations of realignments. Both factors may explain the
absence of speculative intra-EMS capital flows for more than relatively short
periods. Thirdly, tensions between monetary and exchange rate objectives were also
reduced by a clear shift in monetary authorities' attitudes, placing more weight on the long-
term advantages of price stability than on the short-term losses in output. This was
reflected in the fact that some countries accepted as less harmful a tightening of monetary
policy in response to exchange rate developments within the EMS since inflation resurged
during the early period of the EMS while real growth was relatively strong.
Another contributory factor to the avoidance of tension and conflicts has been the way that
the authorities have been prepared to use their  monetary instruments  more promptly and
flexibly in support of their exchange rate. It should also be noted that EMS countries have
followed broadly similar monetary approaches. All countries refrain fom very short-term
control of monetary and credit variables, thus avoiding unnecessary volatility of interest
rates which can be a cause of erratic capital movements. 1 However, this is not the practice
in other countries (e.g. the United States) and erratic capital movements affecting the US
dollar during the life of the EMS have also affected EMS currencies, though not always to
the same extent. The result has been imported instability in the EMS for brief periods.
The short-term room for manreuvre of monetary policy in order to avoid conflict emerging
between exchange rate and monetary policy objectives 'has been also maintained through the
use of three techniques.  Official foreign financing  to cover the oil-related current account
deficits in some cases has contributed to easing the strains on monetary policy imposed 
EMS membership, while other countries have been encouraging private sector foreign
borrowing in order to maintain adequate levels of foreign exchange reserves, despite foreign
exchange market intervention.  Outward foreign exchange controls  have been extended in
some countries and at the same time the Netherlands and Germany have suspended 
view of their changed balance of payments position  restrictions on capital inflows, in so
far as retained to protect their currencies from capital inflows. A third technique
evidenced by French and Dutch experience , has been to  directly regulate a credit monetary
variable  which is a major element of their intermediate monetary objective. Interest rate
adjustments when a currency reaches its EMS intervention point, it is believed, can then be
made without affecting the main element .of the intermediate monetary objective since, in
these countries, the application of a net credit ceiling can direct the bank financing of strong
credit demand to the capital market, and not the money market. Accordingly, action on
1 A more detailed pre~entation of this aspect can be found in the group s last report, dated 13 August 1980, 'On the UK 'Green Paper' on
monetary control (see Annex IV of the 22nd Report on the activities of the Monetary Committee),the interest rates to influence the exchange rate in the short run will not affect the credit
monetary variable, and the quantitative controls on credit in the short-run will only
influence the cost of credit and not the exchange rate.
IV. Mitigation of temporary conflicts between domestic monetary policy objectives and EMS
exchange rate commitments
Although conflicts in the past were limited and infrequent, in future conflicts between
monetary policy objectives and EMS exchange rate commitments may become harder to
avoid. In compliance with its mandate, the group has therefore studied whether there is
some scope for adapting the methods of monetary management to the requirements of the
EMS.
Before discussing the techniques it is recalled that a distinction was made in Chapter II
between conflicts  generally of a temporary nature - when the full burden of adjustment
falls on monetary policy and conflicts that are related to fundamental differences in
economic performance and which eventually may have to be resolved through a realignment
of central rates because more general stabilization measures have proved insufficient or
inappropriate. The following discussion refers to conflicts that have to be resolved within a
given set of central rates either because the conflict is thought to be of a temporary nature or
because the conditions for a successful realignment are not met.
The monetary authorities have shown considerable flexibility in their resort to techniques to
avoid or minimize the effect of conflicts between their exchange rate and monetary policy
objectives. Measures used in the past two and a half years have been:
officially induced foreign borrowing,
foreign exchange controls
direct regulation of a monetary variable
measures offsetting the impact of foreign exchange flows on hank liquidity,
flexibility in choice and formulation of the monetary target.
Resort to  officially induced foreign borrowing  is appropriate to cover the oil-related current
account deficit. This applies, however, only as long as the oil-exporting countries run a
substantial surplus, exerting pressure on economic activity and the balance of payments in
oil-importing countries, and as long as such financing does not impede stabilization and
adjustment policies in the deficit countries.
Foreign-exchange controls  may at least temporarily allow authorities some freedom to direct
monetary policy to domestic objectives while reducing the risk of disturbing capital
flows. However, the introduction of certain capital controls runs against the spirit of the
Community s commitment to free capital movements within the EEc. It is to be noted
that in the area of exchange controls Germany and the Netherlands have been able to
suspend certain controls on inward capital movement.
Direct regulation of a monetary variable  may either involve direct control over the variable
representing the intermediate objective of monetary policy (credit expansion in Belgium in
certain periods) or control over an important determinant of money supply (gross credit
ceilings in Italy and net ceilings in France and the Netherlands). In all these cases some
room for manreuvre is achieved in the short-run for using interest rate policy to affect
capital movements and foreign exchange markets. This possibility was more fully
discussed in the group s Third Report on certains questions relating to monetary policyinstruments dated 29 May 1979 where it was observed that such an approach may also
induce capital flows  which in certain circumstances may be undesired  albeit through
different channels and with different time lags.
In the short run  measures offsetting the impact of fQreign exchange flows  on bank liquidity
can insulate national monetary policies from external developments. Such measures have
been actively used by a number of EMS countries in the past two and a half years, but all
recognize that the margin for manreuvre is limited. Even if the liquidity effects could be
fully neutralized without prolonging periods of tension within the EMS, this protects the
stance of monetary policy only in those cases where the exchange rate pressure is of a short-
term nature and is not related to a fundamental deterioration in a country s economic
position in comparison with that of its EMS partners.
The negative confidence effects from deviation from the announced target might be
mitigated through  flexibility in choosing and formulating such targets.  Opinions diverge as
to the methods of expressing the monetary target. Some experts consider that the setting
of a target range could allow a margin of tolerance for absorbing unexpected capital flows 
well as random shocks emanating from the real and monetary sectors of the domestic
economy; on the other hand, they consider that strict adherence to a single numerical target
might force the authorities concerned to take unwarranted measures which could have
undesirable repercussions on EMS exchange rate relationships. Other experts consider
that, on the contrary, selection of a single target enables conflicts to be more readily
discerned and that setting a target range may give national and international opinion the
impression that the monetary authorities are less determined or even that they would be
prepared to accept in advance deviations from their central objective.
Furthermore, if initial assumptions about the external balance fail to materialize, a money
supply aggregate may be difficult to keep on track. It might therefore be advisable
especially for smaller open economies, to set a different constraint, for example a DCE
ceiling. Nevertheless, it is necessary to monitor closely the development of the money
supply because a DCE ceiling alone may accommodate unwarranted liquidity creation when
the balance of payments moves into surplus. A DCE ceiling is more appropriate in deficit
countries where monetary policy is primarily geared to balance of payments financing than
in surplus countries where price stability is the principal conceni.
V. Conclusions
The Working Party has listed and briefly discussed in the previous chapter a number of
techniques and procedures that have been followed to overcome the problems stemming
from the co-existence .of monetary and exchange rate objectives. It has not, however, been
able to indicate methods that have not already been used and tested by member countries in
the past two and a half years. Moreover, it has pointed out that the margin of manreuvre
available at the technical level is limited. Nevertheless, these techniques have helped the
EMS to withstand severe shocks - most notably the successive oil price rises and the sharp
fluctuations of the US dollar. Not only have conflicts between exchange rate and monetary
policy objectives been relatively mild, but realignments have taken place only on a few
occaSIOns.
The constellation of exchange rates and current balances at the start of the EMS and the fact
that the oil price increase also weakened the external position of the traditionally strong
countries tended to ease the pressure on exchange rates for some time.Without giving a judgement on the prospects for strains in the EMS, it is unlikely that the
potential for conflict will disappear. It does not, however, seem to be possible to establish
predetemined rules for resolving or mitigating such conflicts, given the differences in their
origin; type and intensity.
In order to avoid conflicting policy actions, active coordination between monetary
authorities in EMS countries is needed. These arrangements should allow an assessment
of the causes of conflict for particular countries and of whether other EMS countries may be
able to help by taking appropriate measures, without, however, jeopardizing the attainment
of their own monetary policy objectives. Such coordination, even if it were to involve
monetary objectives, could not, however, by itself guarantee convergence towards stability
within the EMS. This essential requirement calls for a determined effort covering all
spheres of economic policy.u
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.MANDATE
The Working Party on Harmonization of monetary policy instruments is requested by the
Monetary Committee with the concurrence of the Committee of EEC central bank governors
to further the study of the technical issues raised in the Commission departments' note
Monetary policies 1979-80' (Doc. Il/562/80)  with particular reference to the following
points:
Quantitative analysis of certain past experiences of stabilization policies in the Commu-
nity, describing the interaction between monetary and other policies (taking into account
the different instruments in the countries examined).
Examination of the technical problems  particularly on interest rates and other
operational variables  stemming from the co-existence of monetary and exchange rate
objectives within the EMS, given its requirement of convergence towards stability.
Definition and analysis, on the basis of time series, of indicators of the stance of monetary
policies within the Community and the EMS and identifying sources of tension in the
system. In this context the Working Party could examine developments in monetary
aggregates, interest rates and exchange rates, both in relation to each other and to non-
monetary variables.
The Governors expressed the wish that when the Group begins to tackle the wide-ranging task
entrusted to it, it should establish an order of priorities and thus seek to concentrate its first
report, which might then be submitted by, say, the autumn, on the subject matter of the
second indent.Lastly, the Committee continued its activities in the field of international monetary
relations; in particular it prepared t~e declaration adopted by the Community before the
Bretton Woods institutions; it also several times studied the monetary and financial aspects
of North-South relations.
The Working Party on Harmonization of Monetary Policy Instruments a joint working
party of the Monetary Committee and the Committee of Governors, produced a report on
Technical problems stemming from the co-existence of monetary and exchange rate
objectives within the European Monetary System . The Working Party on Capital
Markets continued to examine developments on the capital markets of the Member States
on the international capital market.European Communities  Monetary Committee
Twenty-third Report on the Activities of the Monetary Committee
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities
1982  41 pp. - 17.6 x 25 cm
DE, EN, FR
ISBN 92-825-3114-
Catalogue number.: CB-35-82-522-EN-
Price (excluding V AT) in Luxembourg
ECU 4.44 BFR 200 IRL 3. UKL 2. USD 4.
The twenty-third report on the activities of the Monetary Committee gives an account of the
chief areas of the Committee s work for 1981.
A short introduction reviews the economic situation and the main events of 1981: the
stagnation of world trade, the sharp fluctuations in interest rates and exchange rate
relationships, and the further deterioration in the Community s terms of trade. The EMS
continued to work satisfactorily; there were two realignments in 1981, one of which, on 4
October, was the first extensive realignment since 1979.
In 1981, the aim of a number of the Committee s activities was to contribute to the
Community s monetary cohesion and stability. Important internal studies were also
carried out on the technical aspects of developing the European Monetary System further.
As regards the strengthening of convergence, the Committee examined the economic and
monetary situation of two countries in particular difficulties: Italy, in connection with her
temporary measures concerning foreign exchange purchases, and Belgium following the
Commission Recommendation to the Belgian authorities pursuant to the 1974 decision on
convergence. The Committee also continued with its regular examination of the economies
of the member countries.
The Committee studied the effects of certain rigid indexation systems on national economies
and their possible monetary consequences, and produced an opinion on this subject. The
Committee also several times analysed the implications for the world economy and notably
the Community economy of interest rate movements in the United States and of the dollar
exchange rate, and examined the possibilities available to the European authorities for
guarding against the effects of United States policy.